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1.   Introduction 
Human activities are driving atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations beyond levels 
experienced by previous civilizations.  The uncertainty surrounding our understanding of the 
resulting climate change poses nontrivial challenges for the design and implementation of 
strategies to manage the associated risks.  One challenge stems from the fact that the climate 
system can react abruptly and with only subtle warning signs before climate thresholds have 
been crossed (Stocker, 1999; Alley et al., 2003).  Model predictions suggest that anthropogenic 
greenhouse-gas emissions increase the likelihood of crossing these thresholds (Cubasch and 
Meehl, 2001, Yohe et al, 2006).  Coping with deep uncertainty in our understanding of the 
mechanisms, locations and impacts of climate thresholds presents another challenge.  Deep 
uncertainty presents itself when the relevant range of systems models and the associated 
probability functions for their parameterizations are unknown and/or when decision-makers 
strongly disagree on their formulations (Lempert, 2002).  Furthermore, the requirements for 
creating feasible observation and modeling systems that could deliver confident and timely 
prediction of impending threshold crossings are mostly unknown. These challenges put a new 
emphasis on the analysis, design, and implementation of Earth observation systems and 
strategies to manage the risks of potential climate threshold responses. 
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2.   Needed information 
A workshop at the Aspen Global Change Institute in July of 2005 assessed the information needs 
posed by potential anthropogenic crossings of climate thresholds.  The participants concluded 
that reducing key uncertainties about climate thresholds is feasible.  Doing so requires enhanced 
efforts in mission-oriented basic science (Stockes, 1997), research into the potential impacts of 
crossing such thresholds, and the design of strategies that could efficiently reduce the likelihood 
that those impacts would be experienced.  The participants agreed that these efforts would be 
well informed by new approaches of analyzing risk management strategies, such as robust 
decision-making or optimal reliable strategies (Lempert et al, 2003, McInerney and Keller, 
2006).  These new approaches are required, for example, when the applicability of the more 
traditional expected-utility framework cannot be assured (Lempert et al., 2003; Tol, 2003).  The 
expected utility analysis relies on a sound assessment of the economic impacts and the 
probabilities of the threshold responses.  This information is, however, deeply uncertain at this 
time (Cubasch et al, 2001, Tol, 2003, Yohe et al., 2006).  Robust decision-making (Lempert 
2002, Lempert et al, 2003) seeks to identify strategies that perform well across a wide range of 
plausible impacts and a wide range of plausible probability density functions.  Optimal reliable 
strategies limit the odds of undesirable outcomes in an efficient way (McInerney and Keller, 
2006).  Thinking in terms of risk management can help identify how and where reducing 
uncertainties could produce considerable social benefits (Yohe, 1996; Nordhaus and Popp, 1997; 
Keller et al., 2004).  This includes exploring the high tail of the probability density function of 
climate sensitivity and estimating the locations of climate thresholds. 
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Table 1 summarizes lines of evidence that lead to these conclusions.  It also indicates, through 
color-coding, the degree of confidence in this evidence (Schneider and Sarukhan, 2001).  The 
subjective confidence in the threshold locations, ability for timely detection, and potential 
consequences are often “exploratory or speculative”.  Key lines of evidence about future climate 
thresholds are deeply uncertain.  A potential collapse of the North Atlantic meridional 
overturning circulation (MOC) is a case in point. Current approaches of determining the 
location of the relevant forcing thresholds and the possible consequences of crossing them are 
still exploratory.  The current uncertainties make timely prediction of a potential  MOC collapse 
extremely difficult.   
 
3.  A Risk Management Approach 
Potential threshold  responses in natural and social systems play an important role in the 
interpretation of Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
[UNFCCC], wherein nations commit themselves to preventing “dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992).  Persistent deep uncertainties about 
climate thresholds impede the design of climate policy under the UNFCCC. They cast doubt on 
the location of the critical boundaries and the attribution required to connect policy levers with 
policy targets.  They also combine with uncertainty about climate sensitivity to question our 
ability to link specific concentration thresholds to reducing the likelihood of “dangerous 
interference”. 
 
Since the complexities of potential threshold responses undermine the applicability of expected-
utility analyses, they underscore the importance of adopting more general risk management 
approaches.  These approaches would support the design of long-term policy to avoid crossing   5
critical thresholds of “dangerous” climate change.  These would likely be specified under the 
UNFCCC as concentration or temperature targets and be implemented as emissions targets.  
These long-term targets should be adjusted over time as new information becomes available.  
The risk management approach also sheds light on how to design near-term policies that are 
consistent with “moving long-term targets”.  Near-term policies could be framed as a hedge 
against the costs of policy adjustments.  These could be implemented either by limiting the 
likelihood of crossing the thresholds (Keller et al, 2000; McInerney and Keller, 2006, Yohe et 
al., 2006) or by maintaining the feasibility of specific concentration or temperature limits (Yohe 
et al., 2004, 2005).  Indeed, slowing the pace of climate change, even modestly, is a potentially 
efficient way of increasing the likelihood of confident and timely prediction of threshold 
crossings, even though this strategy might make the signal more difficult to detect.  To be 
economically efficient, though, the adjustment process must be predictable and transparent, 
much like the predictable rules that define the anticipations of adjustments by markets in the 
conduct of monetary policy in countries such as the United States.   
 
Textbooks (Stiglitz and Walsh, 2002) tell us that the Federal Reserve makes periodic short-term 
adjustments within the boundaries of long-term targets for growth in the money supply, even as 
research continues into defining the best policy targets in an uncertain world (Jensen, 2002; 
Walsh, 2003). The former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Alan Greenspan (Greenspan, 
2004) stated that these adjustments and the specifications of long-term targets are tempered by 
“crucial elements of risk management” (pg. 37).  More specifically, the former Chairman wrote 
(pg. 37): “For example, policy A might be judged as best advancing the policymakers’ 
objectives, conditional on a particular model of the economy, but might also be seen as having 
relatively severe adverse consequences if the true structure of the economy turns out to be other 
that the one assumed.  On the other hand, policy B might be somewhat less effective under the   6
assumed baseline model but might be relatively benign in the event that the structure of the 
economy turns out to differ from the baseline.” His words and the continuing debate over policy 
design can be cast into the context of how best to respond to the threat of climate thresholds. 
Hedging against even speculative descriptions of what might be “intolerable” impacts of crossing 
a threshold can make sense. The efficacy of such “act-as-you-learn” hedging can be improved by 
better information and further investigations of how to design adaptive mitigation strategies.  
 
4.   Implications for the Design of Research Portfolios 
Climate thresholds pose deep intellectual challenges at the interface of pure and policy-relevant 
science.  Reducing the risk of future surprises requires a balanced and diversified research 
portfolio that analyzes the range of possible thresholds.  Possible elements of such a research 
portfolio that are likely to pay dividends include: (i) refining the probabilistic analysis of paleo-
events to improve predictions of future climate change; (ii) characterizing the connections 
between monitoring and early prediction of threshold crossings; (iii) reducing the uncertainty of 
decision-critical parameters, such as climate sensitivity; (iv) estimating the impacts of threshold 
crossings; (v) analyzing strategies to reduce the risk of threshold crossings; and (vi) 
investigating ways of representing and communicating key uncertainties to decision-makers, 
stakeholders and the general public.  It is important that the research portfolio covers many 
potential thresholds, ranked according to their importance.  Currently, the threshold of a 
potential weakening or collapse of the MOC is drawing much of the attention, but it is not clear 
that it poses the most imminent or most dangerous threat. 
 
While the current understanding of potential climate thresholds is uncertain, crucial 
information needs and research strategies for addressing them are becoming clear.  Improving   7
our understanding of the impacts associated with a growing list of possible thresholds and our 
understanding of how anthropogenic forcing affects their likelihoods is crucial to enhancing our 
ability to select long-term policy objectives and to craft short-term hedges for the effective 
management of climate risks.  
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Table Heading: 
 
Table 1: Properties of potential threshold responses.  The subjective confidence is color-
coded in terms of the IPCC convention:  “well established”, “competing explanations”, 
“established but incomplete”, and “exploratory or speculative” (Schneider and Sarukhan, 
2001).  The temperature thresholds in the second column refer to the approximate changes in 
globally averaged surface temperatures relative to pre-industrial conditions. Note that some 
values (e.g., Oppenheimer and Alley, 2004) are based on a precautionary interpretation of 
the available evidence (Keller et al., 2005).  The “timely detection” (third column) refers to 
an actionable warning sign for the threshold response (as opposed to the crossing of the 
approximate temperature or carbon dioxide concentration threshold) that would enable 
reversing the anthropogenic forcing to reduce the risk of the threshold response to low levels.  
The references given in the last column are a subset of key publications, more detailed 
























≈ 7 m sea-level rise, 
Possible MOC weakening, 
Damages depend on melting rate 
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production, 
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Food production, Flooding 
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(Link and Tol, 2004) 
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≈ 5 m sea-level rise, 
Possibly severe 
Damages depend on melting rate 
(Oppenheimer, 1998) 
(Oppenheimer and Alley, 2004) 
(Vaughan and Spouge, 2002) 
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